“In the course of promoting the international trade myth, the USSR has permitted the social philosophers in the West to conclude that commercial relationships are the most effective means of taming Soviet aggressive attitudes. If there were only more consumer goods available in the USSR, perhaps the contentment that comes with owning a toaster would begin to subdue the urge to destroy Afghanistan. Such assumptions, based on mirror-imaging, fail to note that the Soviet hierarchs already have access to all the Western goods that interest them. The wants and needs of the ‘people’ are irrelevant to any question of government policy, and the Soviet public has been out of the participating political loop for close to seven decades.
“Since the end of World War II the USSR has succeeded in building powerful economic dependencies and constituencies in other countries. The prosperity of the US wheat farmer has become, increasingly, a function of decisions made in Moscow rather than in Washington. Their case is simply put: If we don’t sell them the wheat, the Canadians, Argentinians, or someone else will! Today all economic sanctions available to the US government must be measured against their effects on many large American banks, which have, in the quest of high returns, overextended themselves in granting credits to the USSR and her impoverished satellites…
“Businessmen, sometimes considered the intellectual superiors of politicians and frequently characterized as shrewd and hardheaded, have somehow always led the list of easy gulls. Success in US corporate life doesn’t mean that one will succeed in negotiations with the Soviets. If anything, the high-velocity American businesspeople are made more vulnerable by their reputation for ‘getting things done.’ When they go to a country where nothing ‘gets done’ until every conceivable political implication has been weighed on the scales of Marx (as amended) and examined under the intense, searching lamp of the organs, it is no longer business. Associated with the hyper-attitudes are the numerous little disabling conceits having to do with image, prestige, imagined power, and ‘success.'”
Less has changed in the Soviet union than is imagined, and few have delved into the very effective scissors methodology that China and Russia have used to great effect to plunder the West’s technological superiority and economic wealth. Interesting that this book, published in the mid-80s by grizzled IC professionals, so well characterizes the essential Western vulnerability to a pervasively Marxized society.